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Governor’s testimony before the Parliamentary Budget Committee
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I appear before this Committee as part of the Parliamentary discussion of the State Budget for 
2010. For the fi rst time in the past two years, we are at a juncture where incipient signs are 
emerging that the global economic and fi nancial crisis is stabilising. This can be deduced from 
the macroeconomic projections by various international agencies in recent weeks, which indi-
cate that the dynamic of successive downward revisions of GDP growth has come to a halt, 
and that in some areas there have even been upward revisions. 
Part of this improvement is in response to the aggregate demand stimulus and fi nancial sys-
tem support policies which, undoubtedly, have acted to offset the enormous contractionary 
impulses experienced and to stabilise the fi nancial markets. Notwithstanding, uncertainty over 
economic and fi nancial developments in the coming quarters remains high. 
At times like the present, the task of economic policies becomes vitally important to ensure 
that the recovery has suffi ciently sound foundations. In the Spanish economy this task is par-
ticularly signifi cant, since although recent data also point to an easing in recessionary trends, 
both the downturn in employment and the rapid deterioration in public fi nances shape a situ-
ation laden with challenges and diffi culties. We are at a crossroads where economic policy 
action may be decisive in setting us once more on a path of growth and increasing well-
being. 
My testimony today, as part of the Parliamentary discussions on the Budget, offers me an op-
portunity to analyse the role budgetary policy should play and the need for this policy to be 
underpinned by a series of structural reforms that remove the obstacles to a recovery in eco-
nomic activity, in employment and in public fi nances. I shall begin with a brief reference to the 
international setting and to the economic outlook for the euro area. It is well known that these 
settings determine the behaviour of monetary policy. Regarding this latter point, allow me to 
remind you that the ECB Governing Council will meet later this week; accordingly, my appear-
ance here is in what we call purdah, and my comments should not be interpreted, under any 
circumstances, as a prelude to or anticipation of the monetary policy discussions or decisions 
at this meeting. 
After several quarters of continuous deterioration which led the world economy to the biggest 
contraction since the Second World War, the latest economic indicators are beginning to point to 
a pick-up in activity and in international trade, which is more evident in the emerging than in the 
more advanced economies, where the signs of improvement are somewhat more incipient.
These signs are not unconnected to the swift and resolute intervention by the public authori-
ties, which has proven effective in checking the growing perception of risks on fi nancial mar-
kets and in increasing agents’ confi dence, thereby playing a valuable role in containing this 
crisis. 
But it is precisely now when the results of the measures are coming to fruition that it is most 
important to shun complacency and untimely and excessive optimism, which might curtail the 
process. The latest forecasts from the IMF and from many other supranational institutions 
admittedly include upward revisions of world output growth rates in 2010; but they also em-
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phasise the persistence of a high degree of uncertainty. This applies in particular to fi nancial 
market developments, where certain tension indicators still remain at high levels. 
It seems reasonable under these conditions that the most immediate objectives of the eco-
nomic authorities should continue to focus primarily on restoring the orderly working of fi nan-
cial markets and on maintaining the aggregate demand stimulus policies until economic recov-
ery takes fi rm root, as was recently reiterated at the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit. Further ahead, 
however, the main challenge will be to identify the appropriate time for withdrawing the excep-
tional measures that have been adopted in the fi nancial, fi scal and monetary realms, avoiding 
both a premature withdrawal that might undermine what has been achieved and an unneces-
sary prolongation that might ultimately generate dynamics that are diffi cult to reverse, and that 
are harmful to growth and well-being. The complexity of such a process means it is necessary 
to design forthwith effi cient exit strategies, so that they may be implemented when the time is 
right. 
The euro area also shares, albeit to a lesser extent than other zones, these signs of incipient 
improvement. The latest economic data have been less adverse than expected and the quan-
titative and qualitative indicators coming to light point to a stabilisation of activity in the very 
short term which, according to the ECB’s projection exercises, will be followed by a presum-
ably slow recovery that will not be free from diffi culty. 
Public fi nances have deteriorated considerably as a result of the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers, the discretionary measures to stimulate aggregate demand and action to shore up 
the fi nancial system. In turn, the fi nancial crisis and the fall-off in activity have severely affected 
certain European banks, which depend in part on public sector support and which remain 
subject to a deleveraging process whose scope is still not readily discernible. 
On the prices front, the risks of defl ation have diminished substantially. Although the strong 
easing in commodities prices until mid-year meant that infl ation turned negative, there is a 
broad consensus, of which the ECB is part, that anticipates infl ation will resume positive levels 
towards the end of the year. Such levels would, however, be moderate for a relatively lengthy 
period, against a background marked by considerable slackness in productive capacity which 
will help contain potential infl ationary pressures. 
The benchmark interest rate in the euro area, at 1% since last May, has proven appropriate in 
a setting in which infl ation expectations have remained anchored and in which the effects on 
the economy have been complemented, moreover, by those of the various exceptional meas-
ures adopted by the ECB Governing Council since October 2008. Such measures included 
most notably the unlimited provision of liquidity to the banking system at terms extending up 
to one year and a programme for the outright purchase of mortgage bonds and other similar 
securities issued in the euro area. 
Moving now to the Spanish economy, it is clear that the acute international fi nancial crisis and 
recession in the main areas of the world fed through with great intensity to Spain, exacerbating 
the correction of the real estate market that had begun previously and prompting rapid job 
destruction. The fact that the powerful external contractionary trends coincided with the inter-
nal adjustment needed after a long expansionary phase has led to a decline in economic activ-
ity that is unprecedented in recent decades. 
On the data available, output fell by 4.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2009 as a 
result of the marked sluggishness of national demand, particularly private spending. Only the 
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public-sector components of demand have held at positive growth rates, and in the case of 
public investment this was due above all to the roll-out of the Local Investment Plan last April. 
The strong contractionary impact of the decline in domestic spending on economic activity 
has been cushioned, however, by external demand. That said, the positive effect of foreign 
trade has been the consequence, above all, of the substantial cut in imports, since exports - 
despite improving their market share - have also been affected by the sharp decline in world 
trade.
Fortunately, the latest fi gures for the Spanish economy indicate that, as in the euro area and in 
the rest of the world, the sharpest phase of the contraction is now behind us. The decline in 
activity in the second quarter was still substantial (1.1%), but more moderate than in the fi rst 
quarter (1.6%). As in other areas, the main conjunctural indicators are beginning to show signs 
of more modest declines or of stabilisation, suggesting that the virulence of the crisis has con-
tinued to abate in the third quarter of this year. 
The recession is also correcting some of the main imbalances that built up in the Spanish 
economy during the boom period, mainly high private-sector debt, the excessive weight of the 
real estate sector and a persistent infl ation differential, which translated into a growing external 
defi cit. 
The growth rate of credit to the private sector has fallen substantially and will probably con-
tinue to do so in the coming quarters. Such developments in lending correspond to what 
might be expected - in circumstances like the present - of its usual cyclical pattern, exacer-
bated by the tension on international fi nancial markets. Conceivably, household and corporate 
debt ratios, which increased rapidly during the expansionary phase, will continue the adjust-
ment on which they have embarked in recent quarters, and this requires that agents’ debt 
should grow for some time at a rate below that of income generated. 
The strong concentration of resources in the real estate market is also being corrected, with a 
very swift decline in new housing starts, although this has not prevented the emergence of a 
sizeable housing overhang and downward pressure on prices as the fall in demand has also 
been very sharp. Nonetheless, cuts in interest rates and in house prices have placed housing 
affordability indicators at more moderate levels, which will help boost house purchases. 
Similarly noteworthy is the reduction in the infl ation rate in Spain in recent months, which is 
proving more marked than in the euro area. This decline is underpinned not only by the great-
er effects induced by the course of oil prices but also by the fall in the prices of industrial goods 
and in the notable easing in services prices, which are growing below 2%, after having held at 
a persistent rate of increase of around 4% for many years. It would be most benefi cial for the 
economy to seize this opportunity to make the appropriate reforms to services markets, so 
that this pattern in moderation may be maintained when household expenditure picks up.
The strong adjustment in spending is also manifest in a rapid reduction in the external defi cit, 
which may have halved by 2009 from its level of close to 10% of GDP in 2007. Ideally, however, 
the spillover effect of the weakness of national demand on imports should be reinforced by a 
strengthening of the export base through the improved competitiveness of our companies. 
But we should not lose sight of the fact that the correction of these imbalances is coming 
about through a severe contraction in output that is exerting a most adverse effect on employ-
ment, as a result of the problems present in the functioning of the labour market, and on 
public fi nances. 
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Job destruction, which was concentrated in the second half of 2008 in construction, subse-
quently spread both to industry and to market services, affecting temporary contracts most 
especially. After the sharp drop in employment in the closing months of 2008 and early 2009, 
the pace of job destruction has slackened, largely due to the effects of the launch of the Local 
Investment Plan. And since the dynamism of the labour force has held up well into 2009, the 
unemployment rate has skyrocketed from 8% in 2007 to almost 18% in the second quarter of 
the current year. The sharp employment adjustment has prompted a rise in apparent labour 
productivity from a rate below 1% in 2007 and the previous years to more than 3% in the 
second quarter of 2009. Unfortunately, these productivity fi gures are not the outcome of gen-
uine improvements in the effi ciency of productive processes, meaning they will hardly be sus-
tainable in the medium term.
The fact that labour costs are still growing at a high rate in this situation (on National Accounts 
fi gures wages increased by 4.6% in the second quarter of 2009) while employment was de-
clining at a rate of over 7% and infl ation was negative, reveals once more the persistence of 
serious ineffi ciencies in the behaviour of our labour market. 
The outlook for the Spanish economy remains highly uncertain, albeit less so in recent months 
in light of the likely recovery in the world economy in 2010. The Spanish economy will probably 
continue posting declines in output in the second half of this year, in contrast to the modest 
pick-up in activity expected in the euro area. Bearing on this different behaviour will be the 
marked weakness of investment, not only in the case of housing, given the supply overhang, 
but also probably in that of corporate investment, since low capacity utilisation allows increas-
es in demand to be addressed without having to undertake new investment projects. Nor will 
it seem feasible to increase public investment in 2010, following the intense effort made in 
2009, linked largely to the above-mentioned Local Investment Fund for Employment. 
How private consumption will fare is much more diffi cult to predict. Although the main deter-
minants - such as the behaviour of employment - will not be favourable, the high level of the 
household saving rate makes it conceivable that, if the factors of uncertainty were to progres-
sively dispel, consumption might recover signifi cantly.
The main factor underpinning activity in 2010 should therefore be the external sector. The fact 
that the recovery in the Spanish economy lags that in the other European countries somewhat 
may provide for more expansionary behaviour of exports, whose trajectory has been reason-
ably positive.
Foreseeably, then, a gradual growth phase based on recovery in the external sector and on the 
progressive extension of its impulses to business investment and employment will begin over 
the course of next year, laying the bases for a demand-led expansion. However, as a result of 
the spillover effect of the negative 2009 rates, average growth in 2010 might post a moderate 
decline. 
This trajectory of slow recovery in activity broadly matches the government’s macroeconomic 
projection that acts as a basis for the State Budget for 2010. Yet as I said, there is a risk that 
business investment may perform somewhat worse than foreseen in this scenario. 
But in my view, what is most important at present is not the exact date on which activity will 
begin to post a positive rate or whether its rate of increase will be greater or less than forecast 
in 2010; rather, it is the scale of the medium-term challenges involved in exiting the most com-
plicated situation the Spanish economy has faced in recent decades. To entrench the recovery 
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will necessarily require absorbing large numbers of unemployed; the reversal of unemploy-
ment’s harmful effects on confi dence and public fi nances; restoring health to the fi nancial posi-
tion of households and fi rms; and, in sum, the restructuring of a growth model that was not 
sustainable, especially under the new conditions created by the international crisis. And, as I 
have reiterated on many occasions, to do this it will be vital to adopt ambitious measures and 
reforms. 
The economic policies pursued since the start of the crisis have focused, logically, on counter-
ing the contractionary forces at play, and the efforts deployed have contributed to lessening 
their impact. But now the slump phase has bottomed out and there are signs of a possible 
stabilisation, we must adopt an approach geared to absorbing the most negative effects of the 
crisis, such as the high level of unemployment and of the budget defi cit, by addressing the 
structural problems of the Spanish economy so as to restore its growth potential and to pre-
vent the risk of a scenario of prolonged economic slackness from materialising. 
The demand-side policies pursued to combat the economic crisis have been very energetic. 
The cuts in offi cial interest rates by the ECB have fed through to interbank markets and to 
credit transactions, and although borrowing conditions remain very tight, as a result of the 
upward revision of credit risk, the decline in interest rates is undoubtedly contributing to allevi-
ating the fi nancial pressure on the private sector. Moreover, these measures will continue to 
have signifi cant effects in Spain in the coming quarters, given the prevalence of fl oating rates, 
which will continue alleviating the burden of debt for households and fi rms. 
Fiscal policy has also contributed to cushioning the decline in activity by means of a most 
substantial budgetary drive, one greater than that in other developed countries. The effect of 
the numerous activity-supporting measures adopted in the past two years, along with the 
impact on public fi nances of the far-reaching cyclical downturn and with the loss of the ex-
traordinary tax revenue from the real estate boom during the expansionary phase, have 
prompted a most rapid and sharp increase in the budget defi cit. On the latest offi cial fi gures 
announced by the government, the budget defi cit could climb to around 10% of GDP at the 
end of this year, an unprecedented level in our recent history.
And the outlook for the defi cit, in the absence of ambitious measures, is a complex one. True, 
some of the budgetary measures adopted were designed to be temporary, meaning that once 
the period they are in force expires, the budgetary situation ought to improve. Yet the cyclical 
change will take time to exert positive effects on public fi nances, as the path of recovery of 
activity in 2010 will still be weak. But what is important is to realise that the defi cit generated 
over these two years has a signifi cant structural component, given that current primary public 
spending has maintained a high growth rate and the sizeable extraordinary revenue linked to 
the real estate sector has been lost for good. 
The deterioration in the fi scal position is manifest in a strong increase in public debt. As our 
own experience shows, the dynamic of rising indebtedness can prove diffi cult to break, espe-
cially when it is inconceivable that we can count in the future on some of the factors that sig-
nifi cantly helped reduce debt in the past, such as interest-rate cuts and high economic growth 
over a very lengthy period.
Overall, all these factors increase the risk that, in the absence of corrective measures, the fi scal 
position will continue to worsen. Further, they lead to the conclusion that the room for budget-
ary policy to expand has been completely exhausted, and that it is vital that a credible strategy 
of budgetary consolidation be adopted for the medium term. If not, the increase in public debt 
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and its infl uence on the net borrowing costs of our economy, and even on the very soundness 
of the fi nancial system and its capacity to properly channel resources, may become a very 
heavy weight holding back our possibilities of recovery. 
Given the fi scal imbalance that has built up, the scale of adjustment needed is most sizeable 
and will therefore require the adoption of highly ambitious measures on all budgetary fronts. It 
will be constantly necessary to strike a diffi cult balance between appropriately signalling the 
commitment to budgetary stability and, at the same time, not curbing the path of economic 
recovery. Past experience shows that the success of fi scal consolidation strategies hinges 
largely on their composition, so that cuts in public spending, especially non-productive spend-
ing, play an essential role in reducing the defi cit. Unproductive spending, both on consumption 
and investment, should therefore be particularly scrutinised and monitored. In any event, when 
structural distortions have become considerable, certain elements of the tax structure have 
inevitably to be revised. Here it is vital to fully preserve effi ciency in agents’ saving and invest-
ment decisions, so that long-term growth prospects are not compromised. Selecting tax 
measures is never easy, and less so when the tax base is being eroded; consequently, tax 
instruments that cause least distortion should be used. In any case, we should ensure that 
increases in tax revenue are actually earmarked to reducing the budget defi cit and not to fi -
nancing potential spending slippages.
The government has announced its intention to resume defi cit levels compatible with stability 
in 2012, in line with the horizon defi ned by the European authorities in the application of the 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. The State Budget for 2010, the fi rst to be prepared 
under this general consolidation strategy, confi rms this commitment. It is along the lines re-
quired to give credibility to the process, although to ensure that the budgetary targets are re-
alistic, all economic agents must be convinced that, in the event of deviations occurring, all 
necessary measures will be taken to achieve such objectives. Lastly, and more clearly than on 
any other occasion, I must reiterate what I have said in all my previous Budget-related appear-
ances: given the high degree of decentralisation of the State in Spain, it is of paramount im-
portance that the territorial tiers of government should also commit themselves to reducing the 
defi cit through compliance with the provisions laid down in budgetary stability legislation.
The attention I have given to budgetary policy, in step with the rationale behind this appear-
ance, should not however obscure one particular fact. This is namely that, at present, the main 
instrument available to the national economic authorities to address the crisis, strengthen the 
chances of recovery and push through fi scal consolidation plans are supply-side and struc-
tural reform policies, geared primarily to improving employment-generation capacity, facilitat-
ing change in the weight of productive activities and increasing the economy’s effi ciency and 
productivity. The future of the Spanish economy will turn to a great extent on these policies, 
not just in the long run but more immediately, where the structural strengths and weaknesses 
of the different economies inside and outside the euro area will be highlighted. 
And what has become obvious, given the present scale of public spending derived from the 
deterioration in employment, is that the viability of any credible budgetary consolidation strat-
egy in the Spanish economy depends on swift and far-reaching changes to the trends cur-
rently prevailing in the labour market. Without a signifi cant reduction in unemployment it will be 
very diffi cult to reverse the course of public spending and ensure a sustained recovery in the 
tax authorities’ capacity to raise revenue. The downturn in employment and the rise in unem-
ployment are the most serious problem facing the Spanish economy, and that most hamper-
ing the recovery and fi scal consolidation. Unavoidably, then, reforms to labour institutions must 
be promptly undertaken that draw our unemployment rate closer to that of the more devel-
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oped countries, thus checking fl ows to unemployment and enabling workers who have lost 
their jobs to return as soon as possible to an active working life. 
The reforms should encompass a wide range of institutions. Innovation in hiring arrangements 
is needed to provide for maximum job creation. We must rectify the pronounced segmentation 
currently characterising a labour market with a high temporary employment ratio, with most 
adverse consequences for job stability and for effi ciency and fairness in the economy. In turn, 
collective bargaining needs reforming. This is so as to allow wage settlements to be tailored to 
a greater extent to each company and to the business cycle, but also to equip companies with 
the necessary fl exibility to increase productivity and wages wherever possible. All these devel-
opments will help soften the impact of the crisis on employment, reallocate surplus labour 
towards more productive sectors and raise our economy’s potential growth rate. And there are 
more reforms recommended by analysts: the re-directing of support policies to the unem-
ployed, so greater importance is given to active policies such as training, improvements to the 
intermediation capacity of public employment services, etc. 
In addition to the reform of labour institutions, there are other areas where action should not 
be delayed, even though the effects will be over a longer term. This is the case primarily of 
education, which is pivotal for ensuring a continuous increase in human capital and for rein-
forcing one of the main sources of improving productivity. And, of course, there is a long list of 
reforms outstanding to increase competition in many industries, such as services, energy, rail 
freight transport, etc., to which I have repeatedly referred. 
Lastly, the soundness of the fi nancial system is essential for ensuring the fi nancial fl ows need-
ed to restore economic dynamism. The Spanish fi nancial system has weathered very well the 
direct and indirect effects of the international fi nancial crisis thanks to a series of widely known 
factors that I shall not repeat here. However, the intensity of the adjustment the Spanish econ-
omy is undergoing in a setting of prolonged fi nancial tension further compounds the pressure 
on the fi nancial system in terms of asset impairment, increased bad debts, narrower banking 
margins and the gradual reduction in the buffers built up by the system. Not all institutions are 
equally prepared to face these factors. Accordingly, appropriate mechanisms - such as, in the 
current circumstances, the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks - are crucial for tack-
ling the necessary restructuring processes, without that entailing a distortion in credit fl ows 
that may hamper the economy’s path of recovery. 
To conclude, the Spanish economy is at a decisive crossroads where many challenges must 
be addressed to prevent the situation leading to a long period of economic weakness and to 
be able to embark on a new growth path based on a more productive and sustainable pattern. 
This is not the fi rst time in our recent history that we fi nd ourselves in such a position. We 
emerged from similar situations in the past with major advances and with vigorous growth 
once the necessary decision-making machinery had been geared up to undertake far-reaching 
reforms. This time need be no different. Only through medium-term stability strategies and 
ambitious and well-structured reforms can we overcome these diffi cult circumstances, paving 
the way for a new phase of dynamism and job creation that will further the outstanding trajec-
tory of the Spanish economy in recent decades. 
